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LAW OF PROCEDURE IN 'ATTIC INSCRIPTIONS 
Gerhard Thür 
Legal proceedings in ancient Athens have been studied for nearly 200 
years. I Although scholars began by working with literary sources, they 
increasingly made use of a discipline, new and budding in the nineteenth 
century, Creek epigraphy. Koehler's Corpus lnscriptionum Atticarum (CIA) 
accordingly found its way into the fascicles ofLipsius' manual of Athenian 
law, published successively from 1905 to 1915. Lipsius, however, a typical 
Cerman 'Altphilologe', was not very much interested in new epigraphical 
sources. The great task for hirn was to incorporate into his work Aristotle's 
recently discovered Athenaion Politeia. In my opinion, Lipsius' manual is 
the c1imax of the nineteenth-century philological approach to the Athenian 
law of procedure. 
The leading twentieth-century manual today - in 2001 - is, for all its 
incompleteness, Part III, 'Procedure', in the second volume of Harrison's 
The Law of Athens, a work finished after the author's death in 1969 and 
published in 1971 by today's honorand. Scholarship has MacDowell 
to thank, not only for his own contributions, but for having saved this 
important work. Here, as in MacDowell's own Law in Classical Athens of 
1978, inscriptions are more than decoration. Based on epigraphical sources, 
both authors - like most contributors to this volume - thoroughly discuss 
the historical background of legal institutions. Likewise does Rhodes in 
his Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (1981/93). From 
chapter 42 - and especially from 63 - onwards, Aristotle is dealing with legal 
proceedings. After these major contributions of modern scholarship, one 
should think that only a few recently-published inscriptions need be added 
as a supplementurn to the study of legal procedure in Athens. Unlike the 
study oflaw in other Creek poleis,2 there seems to be no need for a special 
discipline, 'legal epigraphy', in the field oflegal proceedings in Athens. 
I shall now tell you of some of my own experiences working with legal 
inscriptions. After that, I shall try to outline the very special position legal 
epigraphy holds in regard to the study of law in classical Athens, and I shall 
give some examples to illustrate what I understand to be its task. Ir may 
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perhaps be the case that, especially in Athens, to know the law of procedure 
is more helpful for the epigraph ist than a knowledge of epigraphy is for 
understanding legal procedure. 
In the I%Os, as a student ofHans Julius Wolffin Freiburg im Breisgau, 
I began to study the law of evidence in Athenian courts. At that time Wolff
was working on his book Die attische Paragraphe (1%6) - discussed by 
Carawan in this volume - and was mainly interested in Attic oratory. So 
I did my best to share his interests. The result was my study, Die Proklesis 
zur Basanos (1977) , a modest topic which led me, nevertheless, to some 
new ideas about the Athenian system of proofs. Sources were stricrly 
limited to literary ones - so I thought; years later I came upon JG P 96.19 
(412/11 Be) where, without further context, the noun basanos is mentioned; 
any reference to a proklesis, my special interest, is to be exduded. Epigraphy 
is no help in explaining basanos.3 I also used the method applied by Wolff
in his Paragraphe, as he caIled it 'Gesamtinterpretation' . One must not 
pick out only a few words of a forensie speech for study; rather, one must 
investigate the whole legal issue and consider the interests of the litigant 
and his opponent.4 Refining Wolff's method, I soon found myself at a dead 
end: one can prove everything as weIl as its opposite. It is impossible to 
find out what litigants reaIly intended or even are likely to have intended. 5 
Looking for 'die wahre Absicht' behind the words of a forensie speech often 
leads to absurdity or at least - as shown by Stephen Todd in this volume 
- to apona. 
Later, too, I followed Wolff. One ofhis favorite projects was collecting all 
the legal inscriptions of the Greek world. 6 Moving from Vienna to Munich 
in 1976 to work on this project, I found an unforgettable colleague in the 
person of the late Diederich Behrend, one of the best legal epigraphists in 
Germany.7 Compared with oratory, inscriptions speak the dear language of
official documents - no 'Textkritik', no ambiguities about 'wahre Absicht' 
- instead, prosopography and lacunae, new challenges both. Behrend 
undertook a 'Repertorium' of all legal inscriptions; I went on with legal 
proceedings. We started from different ends, Behrend with two regions of
Asia Minor, the Troad and Mysia, and I, after sampling two small inscrip-
tions from Samos,8 chose Arcadia, a region with only a few (but utterly 
difficult and interesting) texts on legal procedure (IPArk). After some delay, 
both projects were published in 1994.9 
While finishing the Arcadian inscriptions, with the aid of alternating 
assistants, I switched my focus to Athens. Some progress has been made in 
the form of smaller contributions, but at the moment, no end of a volume 
IPAth is in sight. 10 After my return to Austria, I instead found a colleague 
to work with me on inscriptions from the Argolid. 11 We will handle this 
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volume first and so I cannot give you a final report on Athens; instead, 
I will explain our methods and present so me preliminary material. Work 
has been prolonged by two methodological problems. The first has to do 
with our definition of the material, that is, of what constitutes an inscrip-
tion on legal procedure. We take the broadest view and so we are compiling 
every text referring to litigation and the settlement of legal disputes, every 
penalty-clause, and every promise of personal immunity (asyLia-clause).1 2 
As Behrend's Repertorium shows, if one uses these criteria, more than 
half of all legal inscriptions concern procedure. The second problem is 
inherited from Wolff. Although we comment on every single inscription, 
we still follow his method of'Gesamtinterpretation'. 13 These two methods 
(compiling as many texts as fulfill any of our criteria and commenting 
in accord with 'Gesamtinterpretation') require a great amount of time; 
checlung by autopsy every important lacuna on stone takes even more. 
What does an 'ideal' commentary on an inscription concerning legal 
procedure look like? As everywhere else in the Greek world, so also in 
Athens there are no inscriptions confined strictly to legal proceedings. 
Everywhere, substantive and adjective law, statutes on concrete issues and 
on juditial enforcement, are mixed up in one and the same text, mostly in 
decrees. In my opinion, to argue which of the two came first historically 
seems useless. 14 To understand the procedural part of a text one has to look 
at the entire text. To understand the entire text, one has to explain its full 
historical and legal background. This is Wolff's 'Gesamtinterpretation' 
transferred from oratory to epigraphy. In our editions, we substantiate this 
concept in a very simple way: after printing the entire text of the inscription 
with an apparatus criticus, we add a synoptic German translation; foomotes 
to the translation explain the historical background, philological and 
epigraphical problems, and questions of substantive law. The commentary 
on procedure can then concentrate on the essentials. In order to combine 
all our commentaries - in a distant future - so as to provide a Greek Law 
of Procedure, we follow a rough schema clearly influenced by Harrison: 
Part I, Judicial Organization: jurisdictional magistrates, lawcourts and their 
respective competences (Harrison's 'Judicial Machine'); we add: litigants, 
types of proceedings, localisation of lawcourts, costs, assistant staff, and 
equipment. In Part II we follow the order of a lawsuit (Harrison's 'Process at 
Law'): summons, claim, preliminary hearing and hearing in chief, evidence, 
judgement, and execution. Occasionally, Part III deals with penalty-clauses. 
Further information about the framework and how it is used practically 
may be found in the volume on Arcadia. 15 In Athens we have the special 
problem that many prominent historical inscriptions also make small-scale 
references to legal proceedings. Is it necessary or at least worthwhile to 
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discuss the entire texts and the huge amount of controversial non-juristic 
literature about them? Certainly not. But sometimes the legal issue can help 
solve historical problems. The principle of 'Gesamtinterpretation' works 
in both directions. 
For the moment, I will consider only the legal aspect of inscriptions. 
How much can epigraphy contribute to a better knowledge of the Athenian 
law of procedure? If we just count the number of procedural inscriptions, 
it seems an enormous amount. Some years ago, Christi an Koch published 
in his thesis Volksbeschlüsse in Seebundangelegenheiten commentaries on all 
procedural inscriptions of the First Athenian League, altogether 52 texts: 
12 political decrees and 40, also political, but more or less uniform, 
honorary decrees, with only summary comments. 16 From JG P there are 
about 50 more texts, including nr. 96, mentioned earlier, containing only 
the word ßacravo<;. Going on to the field of JG II, we have from Euclides 
down to the end of rhe Lycurgan period 85 inscriprions needing full 
commentary and about 100 honorary and proxeny decrees; from the first 
edition of JG III and later publications there are also abour 50 defixiones, 
binding speIls against opponents, witnesses, supporters, magistrates, public 
arbitrators, and judges of lawsuits. Summing up, we come to a figure of 
more than 300 Athenian procedural inscriptions from the fifth to fourth 
centuries BC. Compared with the 42 inscriptions quoted in Harrison II 
(1971) and the 29 in MacDowell 's part III (1978), ir seems impressive. Yet 
even MacDowell has included the most important references and Harrison 
all the essential ones that were published at the time of their respective 
works. Nevertheless, collecting, restoring, and commenting on the bulk 
of all procedural inscriprions makes good sense. Progress will be made in 
small steps and in both directions: better insights into some details oflegal 
proceedings on the one side, better texts and better historical understanding 
on the other. 
It would be taxing to give a long list of tiny observations and small 
conjectures on texts. I would rather take the opportunity to present my 
basic ideas about the Athenian law of procedure and to discuss them in the 
light of so me selected inscriptions. My topics will be: (1) the (Wo stages 
of Athenian lawsuits (a preliminary one before a magistrate and then the 
hearing in chief) and the age of this system; (2) what we know about arbi-
tration; (3) peculiarities of evidence; and (4) the form of judgement. 
The first topic is the division of a preliminary and a decisive stage in 
Athenian procedure. The queen of Athenian procedural inscriptions - in its 
importance to be compared only wirh the law code of Gortyn - is Draco's 
law on homicide from 621120 BC, republished in 409/8 BC. The standard 
edition JG P 104 has adopred Stroud's text of 1968; only revolutionary 
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epigraphic technology would be able to produce a better one. Disregarding 
the regulations ofhomicide, I will concentrate on lines 11-13; in them we 
shall find the whole structure oflegal proceedings, even for c1assical Athens. 
After the provision 'Even if someone kills someone without premedita-
tion' (so Stroud 1968, 6) or 'not intentionally' (so Gagarin 1981, XVI) 
or 'without malice aforethought' (so Carawan 1998, 33) the text runs: 
DlhcaSEv DE 'to~ ßO(JlAtO~ o'('tlo[v] <j>ov[o] E[lacuna 17]E [ß]oAIEuaov'to ' 
'to~ 8E €<I>bo~ Dwyv[6]v[oh (the basileis are to dikazein ... the ephetai are 
to diagignäskein). 
In several articles I have compared these weighty but hardly pellucid 
words with language and procedure in homicide trials of the fifth through 
fourth centuries. 17 For the c1assical period, procedure is c1ear: the basileus as 
initiating magistrate holds three n:pODl1Walm, during which the opponents 
and their witnesses swear the most solemn oaths of guilt or innocence, called 
DUlll,lOalm. Then the basileus has to bring the case before a board of judges, 
the Areopagus or the 51 'ephetai'. The 'judges' in either case decide simply 
by voting. 18 In Antiphon 6.16, the accused XOPTIY0C; (choregos) implores the 
ephetai to decide by their vote which of the two diämosiai is 'more truthful 
and pure' . The wording of the diämosiai quoted by the choregos contains 
each side's case in a nutshell , as Gagarin notes in his new Antiphon trans-
lation (1998, 81 n. 19). The line of defence was that the choregos did not 
kill the boy llij'tE XElPl apallEvo~ llij'tE ßO\)AEUaO~ ewhether by [my] hand, 
raising it, 19 or by instigatingl planning') . The first member of the disjunc-
tive phrase ewhether ... ') exactly fills the lacuna in Draco's law ending 
with the (same) second member, 'or by instigating'; thus: o'l 'tl 0 V <j>ov[ 0] 
Er vm E XElPl apallEvoV] E [ß]oAIEuaov'to. 20 To sum up: the wording of the 
dikazein c1ause in Draco's law accommodates the formulation of a diämosia. 
In the classical period, the basileus formulates the diämosiai in a prodikasia; 
similarly, the action of dikazein in Draco's law is the formulation or enacting 
of the diämosiai by the plural number of basileis (cf Ath. Pol. 57.4) who hold 
the initial hearing, the prodikasia. As in the c1assical period, the ephetai of 
Draco's law perform the activity of diagignäskein after the (plural) basileis 
perform the action of the dikazein - they decided by voting which of the 
two diämosiai was the better one. So I should translate Draco's provision on 
procedure: 'The basileis are to enact (the diämosia, that): "he (the defendant) 
is responsible for homicide whether by his hand, raising it, or by instigating". 
The ephetai are to decide by vote.' Referring to a direct or an indirect act of 
killing, in I. 12/13 Draco states two possible charges a plaintiff or pursuer 
can make. 21 Dikazein, consequently, does not mean 'für verantwortlich 
erklären' (Wolff 1961, 70), nor does it mean either 'adjudge' (Stroud 1968, 
6; Gagarin 1981, XVI), or 'give judgement' (Carawan 1998, 33); rather, 
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it means, 'to decree', that is, to enact the contradictory oaths necessary for 
the trial. In later homicide trials the continuity seems quite evident. All 
other trials in classical Athens have the same primitive structure: a board of 
laymen-judges votes on two statements on which the opponents have sworn 
their oaths, called antjjmosiai. 22 These oaths have much less weight than 
dijjmosiai. From the archaic period onward, the terminology of jurisdiction 
changed - not its structure. In the fifth through fourth centuries BC, the 
archontes no longer perform the ölKasnv; the judges, the ÖlKaatai sitting 
in the lawcourts, do. Now ölKasnv is used synonymously with ÖWYlY-
vmaKnv and Kpivnv. We have only a few traces of the earlier ölKasnv in 
some literary sources where the initiating magistrate is called ' ölKaatTj~' in 
contrast to the heliaia which is to perform the öWYlyvmaKnv (Dem. 23.28, 
43.71; An. Bekker 242.19-22). 
Based on Ath. PoL 3.5 most scholars think archaic magistrates had the 
power to decide trials by their own competence rather than to introduce 
them to a lawcourt. One must be extremely cautious with this source.23 
WhenAth. PoL uses the verb Kpivnv and when Aristode mentions Kpivnv 
under oath in his Politics (l285b9-12), one can see parallels to the law 
code ofGortyn, Ol1vuvta KpivEV (I 12 and often). Perhaps in archaic times 
Athenian magistrates also gave verdicts under oath, but we have not a single 
reference to such a Kpivnv. On the other hand, when ölKasnv or the term 
ölKa(J'tTj~ are attached to a magistrate, he is very likely to bring the case to 
the ephetai or the heliaia: the bi-partite procedure is in evidence. 
After Draco's law, ölKasnv is first mentioned again in the famous 
Phaselis-decree, IG P 10 (GHI 31) da ted 469-450 Be. Some scholars 
even use the term ölKasnv, in my opinion incorrectly, to date the inscrip-
tion. In 1. 18/19 the stone reads: E]i I1EV KataÖlKaal[lacuna 1 0]11 ('iKupo~ 
Eatffi. Recent editors fill the lacuna in this way: KataÖlKaal[n , " Kataöix]l1 
äKUPO~ Eatffi: 'if the magistrate (mentioned 1. 15/16) condemns (active)'. 
Indeed, here the apxai (1. 16) seem to give judgement themselves rather 
than merely act as introducing and presiding magistrates on the classical 
pattern. But the language used elsewhere in the text: [ta~ ö]i Ka~ yl. YVEa9m 
napl[a nOl nO]AEl1apXffil (1. 9/10) and öE~l1tm ÖI[I.K11V] (1. 16/17) can be 
understood more easily in the sense of the fourth century: lawsuits have 
to be tried at the polemarchos' court (1. 9110) and no other (initiating) 
magistrate is allowed to accept an action (ÖI.K11). 24 Accordingly, there is no 
reason to restore the active KataÖlKaa[n in 1. 18/19; I would rather follow 
the earlier restoration by Dittenberger: KataölKaal[911l,,, I1EV ÖI.K]l1 äKUPO~ 
Eatffi. With the passive construction the decree does not say by whom the 
defendant is to be sentenced, and in fact there is no need to do so. Since 
the time of Draco, boards of judges are known and initiating magistrates 
as wel1. 
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From the point of view of a legal historian, the restored verb KataOtKaa[ Et 
is too tentative and unconvincing to allow it to put aside the usual pattern 
of jurisdiction performed in two stages. Following Wade-Gery, the editors 
of GHI (p. 68) hold that the Phaselis-decree must date before Ephialtes' 
reforms (462 BC) by which the magistrates - allegedly -lost their power of 
giving verdicts. Since legal procedures, divided into an introductory stage 
and a decisive one, were in use both before and after Ephialtes, his reforms 
cannot date the decree. Only 'soon after the battle of the Eurymedon' 
(469 BC), can stand (GHI p. 67). 
My second topic is arbitration, in Athens to be divided into 'private' and 
'public'. We have relatively few sources concerning private arbitrators: four 
settlements in arbitration proceedings are handed down, two in a literary 
text, Dem. 59.47, 71, and two inscriptions from the fourth and third 
centuries BC, Ferguson 1938 nt. 2 (cf. Lambert 1997), and IG IF 1289. 
Ferguson 1938 nt. 1 (cf. Lambert 1997), on the other hand, is a formal 
private arbitral award (and not a 'settlement') as they are known also from 
outside Athens, one from Chios and one from Corcyra. 25 The awards use 
terms such as OtKaa'tal, Ka'taOtKa~EtV , f:n:tKPlVEtV, and ytyvooaKEtV; the 
settlements, consequently, use oWAAa't'tEtV in fourth and OWAUEtV in the 
third century Be. Arbitrators are called OWt'tTJ'tal, OWnaK1:al or OwA1J'tat. 
As far as we know, Hellenistic Athens did not make use of international 
arbitration by judges, OtKaa'tal , sent by foreign states. Athenians rather 
themselves rendered international awards,26 so international arbitration is 
not a topic in the Athenian law of procedure. 
Looking at the three Athenian inscriptions concerning private arbitral 
awards or settlements, some peculiarities in terminology are striking: 
consistently Ferguson 1938 nr. 2 (265/4? BC Lambert 1997) has: €1tt 'tolaoE 
OtEAUaaV'tO (1. 3) and U1tO 'tWV aipEI8ev't(j)v OWAU'tWV (1. 5/6); two arbitra-
tors managed a settlement, a diarysis, between two contending groups of 
the 'Salaminii ' . Besides terminology the even number of 'two' points to an 
arbitral settlement: the litigants agreed in a solution proposed by two men, 
evidently one chosen by each party. 
About one century earlier, the same Salaminii had been tried and settled 
(otiJnasav, 1. 2) by five OWl'tTJ'tat (1. 2, 5/6; OWnaK'tat, 1. 81), Ferguson 
1938 nr. 1 (363/2 BC). The odd number of five and the verb Eyv(j)aav (1. 5) 
show that these arbitrators rendered a formal award, perhaps by casting 
votes. After the 'decision' passed by five arbitrators (normally two of them 
appointed by each party, the fifth chosen by the four), the litigants explic-
itly agreed to keep the arbitral award (KaAwc; EXEtv, 1. 5). This illustrates 
best the new theory brought up by Scafuro 1997, 123- 8 denying that an 
Athenian formal arbitral award had any binding or executive forceY Only 
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the litigants' 6~OAOYElV (I. 4/5), a public declaration to keep the award, and 
the claimant's a<!>El08at (I. 65/6), a formal releasing of the defendant from 
liability, were to become relevant to an eventuallawsuit. Arbitration itself 
belonged more to social control than to legal enforcement. In regard to 
these observations, terminology seems to be consistent in the inscription 
Ferguson 1938 nt. 1, too. 
Difficulties arise in the third text, JG IF 1289 (mid-third century BC): 28 
'ta OE Ol€AUOOV oi OlKaO"'tOt [E1tl'tpE\J/aV ll'toov a~<!>o'tEpOOV (I. 3/4; 'the following 
arbitral settlement has been achieved by the judges resorted to by both 
parties'). Who are the OlKoowi? In a settlement, dialysis, we expect to find 
dialytai as in the contemporary inscription, Ferguson 1938 nr. 2. About 
100 years later, a formal award from Corcyra29 reads: ['tao' E1tEKPlVOV 1 oi 
OlKOO'tOt KOt KOlvoi (I. 1; 'verdict of the judges and commonly chosen arbi-
trators'). Here, arbitrators appointed in advance when a building contract 
was ente red, after failing to reconcile the litigants, finally rendered a formal 
award (E1ti![KplOlC;, 1.19/20).30 In Corcyra, arbitrators (KOlVOi) giving an 
award might have been called 'judges' under the influence of the termi-
nology of international arbitration.31 The same influence on terminology 
is probably to be found in the inscription from Hellenistic Athens, JG IF 
1289. Arbitrators sent from foreign cities, whether they manage settle-
ments (OWAUElV) or render formal awards (olKa1;;Elv, YlYVolOKElV, KPlVElV), 
always were called OlKOO'toi Y So the term OlKOOnlC; changed from 'magis-
trate initiating lawsuits' in archaic times to 'man of the jury / judge' in the 
classical period and includes the meaning 'arbitrator' in Hellenistic times. 
The explanation for 'judges' settling a case in arbitration proceedings in 
the Hellenistic inscription JG IF 1289 might then be that the meaning of 
OlKaOnlC; had changed; this makes better sense than seeing these dikastai as 
arbitrators 'chosen from the board of the Heliasts' (Ferguson 1938, 48). 
Public arbitration is quite different. Harrison (1971, 66-8) treats public 
arbitrators, oWl'tT]wi, in an appendix to private arbitrators following his 
chapter 'Courts' . MacDowell (1978, 207-9) does better, combining them 
with the tribal judges, the Forty, established in 403/2 BC or very soon 
thereafter. The proper place of public arbitrators, in my opinion, is among 
the magistrates. Every male Athenian citizen had to serve as a OWl'tT]nlC; 
in his sixtieth year. Though he holds no office he has public responsibility 
for his duties (Ath. PoL. 53.6). By the bureaucratic creation of this institu-
tion, the mature Athenian democracy of the fourth century aimed at two 
goals: to settle most trials by reconciling the opponents and to prepare the 
remaining ones for the hearing in chief Ath. PoL. 55.5 mentions that the 
public arbitrator swears a solemn oath before rendering a1to<!>oolC;, giving 
his sentence. Parallel to private arbitration (Dem. 52.30 ff), 33 it seems to 
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me that the oath is necessary only when the litigants agree with a formal 
award. If the convicted party does not agree, the 'sentence' is completely 
irrelevant. Then, diaita is only an introductory stage and the trial goes 
forward. At the hearing in chief no speaker makes use of an apophasis 
whether in his favour or against his opponent. 34 
For pleading at court, public arbitration is important in a different 
way. No other documents are to be introduced during the hearing in chief 
than those used at the diaita. To ensure this provision Aristotle mentions 
- only connected with public diaita - containers, €XlvOt, where each party's 
documents are to be sealed up (Ath. Pol. 53.2). Lämmli (1938, 117) has 
held that the provision prohibiting new documents did not apply to cases 
tried by one of the archons at his own preliminary hearing, the anakrisis. 
Years ago (1977, 316 fr) I stressed the dose relationship between diaita and 
anakrisis in preparing the hearing in chief. At least, plaintiff and defendant 
are obliged to answer each other. The problem of using new documents is 
to be reconsidered in the light of a tiny inscription, the famous 'cheese pot', 
a lid of a ceramic pot with painted letters. In his editio princeps Boegehold 
(1984) has identified the pot with an echinos. From the inscription, at least 
this much is dear: the echinos was not used in a diaita but in an anakrisis 
- a phenomenon mentioned nowhere in literary sources. This makes 
a strong point that, at least at the end of the fourth century BC, prohibiting 
new documents was not restricted to diaita cases. 35 
Outside Athens the same technical equipment is used for the same 
purpose: the approximately contemporary 'symbola' between Stymphalus 
and Demetrias/Sikyon, IPArk 17.41-7 (303-300 BC), prohibits litigants 
from using documents at the OtKOOnlPWV that were not shown to the 
'synlytai' at a preliminary hearing. These o'UVA\hot, alternatively called 
OtKOO'tOt (lPArk pp. 221-4), have a double role: they attempt to reconcile 
the litigants preparing the non-settled cases for the hearing in chief like 
Athenian public arbitrators and, sitting as a lawcourt, they decide the 
issues. Here, the functions of public arbitration and anakrisis are concen-
trated in the same persons. So, the echinos lid and the parallel from Arcadia 
open further discussion about anakrisis in Athens. 
At the end of an anakrisis or after an unsuccessful public diaita the case 
is to be introduced to court. The term is dmiYEtv d<; 'to OtKOO'tllpwv. This 
is known very weil from literary and epigraphical sources. 36 Relatively new 
is the 'Law in the City-Eleusinium' published by Kevin Clinton (I 980). 
In this inscription two dmiYEtv are mentioned. In 1. 28 the basifeus has 
to introduce a phasis, in 1. 38 the nine archons (most probably) introduce 
private dikai; nothing of great importance, indeed. Based on a better 
restoration suggested by Stumpf (1988, 226), it turns out that the basifeus 
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is to be fined if he does not introduce the phasis. A parallel appears in the 
'Athenian Law of Si lver Coinage', published by Ronald Stroud (1974). 
Here too, special magistrates have the duty to introduce phaseis (11. 18-26) 
under the risk of being punished (11. 32-4) Y 
Since Athenians did not use strict legal terminology, EioaYElv Eie; 't0 
OlKOO'trlPWv has a further meaning: to bring an individual- not a lawsuit 
- to court, i.e., to sue someone. This is easily comprehensible if a private 
person acts as plaintiff: by EloaYElV he can only sue his opponent. In 
epigraphical sources sometimes difficulties arise: if a magistrate is ordered 
to 'EioaYElv', one has to question whether he has to introduce a lawsuit 
or to sue a person. In the first case he has jurisdiction, i]YE~OVtO 'tOOV 
OlKOO'tTlPi.oov, in the second case he does not. This may be doubtful for 
some of the ad hoc appointed magistrates in Athens, some only known 
from inscriptions. If a direct object - a dike or a person - is mentioned 
the answer is obvious; if not, sometimes, there is a simple solution: if the 
magistrate has to care for something, for example building the city walls, if 
he is btl~EATl1i]e;, and imposes a fine, it is his task to act as plaintiff. Only 
when a dike is mentioned does he have jurisdiction.38 Surprisingly, the two 
ETClo'ta'taL, o'{ nVEe; Enq . .ltArl0ov'taL, also called oi. Enl 'ta 'ttLXTI i]lPTI~EVOl in 
JG IF 244, (337/6 Be) function in both positions in different cases: acting 
as a plaintiff after fining an entrepreneur on the one hand and intro-
ducing and presiding over private trials between two entrepreneurs on 
the other. 39 
Inscriptions are full of details about magistrates and their competences. 
Procedure itself, however, is known almost completely from literary 
sources. So my last two points, 'peculiarities of evidence' and 'the form of 
judgement', will be very short. 
Rooted in archaic principles, the law of evidence in classical Athens is 
very primitive. In spite of Aristorle's Rhetorica (1375a 24), in court only 
one kind of evidence in a legal-technical sense exists: the witness. The three 
other of the five so called 'non artificial proofs' (for I exclude 'laws' as they 
have nothing to do with evidentiary facts) are based on witnesses: written 
contracts, if not acknowledged by the opponent, depend completely on 
witnesses; depositions of slaves under torture and litigants' oaths originate 
in extra-judicial proceedings witnessed by the parties' supporters .40 
Beginning from archaic times, witnesses in homicide trials, by swearing 
the same (above mentioned) diämosiai of guilt or innocence as the litigants 
themselves swear, are partisans of either the prosecutor or the defendant. 
The function even of the unsworn witness was always the giving of 
evidence in support of one or the other of the litigants: no witness can be 
compelled by a court or by a party to appear; swearing an oath of disclaimer 
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(tI;WJ..locrla), he always has the chance to avoid any responsibility.41 Only 
a positive deposition, after a protest by the opponent, makes the witness 
liable to a ÖlKll \jI€UÖOJ..laplUplwV. 
The division of witnesses and assignment to one or the other of the 
opponents is the consequence of the primitive way of wording adeposition. 
Ir was customary for the litigant's party to formulate an assertion, usually 
introduced with the words: AB. testifies that "he knows" that...' or AB. 
testifies that "he was present" when .. .', and the witness - insofar as he had 
not sworn the opposite out of court - has nothing else to do except to 
confirm the statement by his presence in court. There is no narration by 
the witness himself, no cross examination, no questions by the court, not 
a single word spoken by the witness. All this is weil known from literary 
sources since the beginning of the fourth century Be. From outside Athens 
there is epigraphical evidence that depositions are made in the same way. 42 
In view of this widespread practice it seems very strange that the 
Athenians until the beginning of the fourth century BC should have 
handled the matter in a c~mpletely different way. Before astatute was 
enacted according to which witnesses were to testif)r in a written document 
to be read out at court,43 they allegedly had reported the facts in their own 
words and also answered questions.44 All this is modern construction. 
The transition from oral to written testimony is nothing other than the 
transition from non-documented to documented testimony. The formula 
'to know something' is the same before and after introduction of written 
evidence.45 Written evidence is one of the bureaucratic measures that go es 
hand in hand with public diaita. Epigraphy is no help on this topic. I can 
refer only to one generally known source, IG IF 1258 (324/3 BC): a cult 
group, the Eikadies, honour one of their members for having entered an 
tnlcrKll\jll~, a formal protest against a witness at the end of a lawsuit.46 This 
only confirms what we knew before from Ath. Pol. 68.4. 
From the next chapter of Ath. Pol. (69) we can see wh at a judgement 
normally looked like. This is the last topic in my very general survey on 
inscriptions and legal procedure. The huge panels of jurors cannot dedare 
a verdicr in any other way except to approve or reject the charge. Like the 
citizen attending the assembly, and also like the witness, the man of the 
jury can only vote to a given text by 'yes' or 'no'. In this type ofjurisdiction, 
contrary to international arbitration, there is no authority to formulate 
and to pronounce a verdict. The trial is over when the herald calls out the 
number of votes: Kat avayop€un 6 Kllpul; 10V apl8J..lov lWV \jItl<pwv ... (Ath. 
Pol. 69.1). Consequently, the rare judgements published on stone quote 
only the charge, or apart of it, and note condemnation or acquitta1. 47 
Two judgements from Athens also seem to refer to the number of votes 
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just as judgements from other poleis sometimes do. IG IF 1646a (= IDi!os 
104-22ba; 346/5 BC), very badly preserved, is to be excluded: because it 
is a judgement by default most probably the figure 444 does not mean 
votes but rather drachmai to be paid by the individual who had been 
sentenced.48 The other one, IG IF 1641 B (= IDi!os 104-126 C, middle 
of the fourth century BC), an acquittal, records 100 votes for the plaintiff, 
and 399 for the defendant. Summing up, 499 votes point to a dikasterion 
of 501 judges. Two votes are missing, difficult to explain. The reason for 
publishing the judgement was the acquittal, unquestionably in favour of 
the defendant. The reason for publishing the figures of the votes seems, 
however, to have been in favour of the plaintiff: 100 votes from a total of 
499 are exacdy more than one fifth. One vote less for the plaintiff, and he 
would have had to pay a fine of 1000 drachmai. The inscription, perhaps 
after arguing about the two missing votes at court, sec ures that the plaintiff 
will not be fined. 49 
After reviewing legal proceedings from the preliminary stage to the 
sentence I come to a conclusion. As I stressed at the beginning, epigraphy 
by itself offers only a poor chance for studying the Athenian law of 
procedure. Only details, certainly not without interest, result. On the 
other hand, for working on legal inscriptions, an idea of legal proceedings 
known from literary sources is absolutely necessary.50 
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